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BOOK REVIEWS
DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS. The United States and
the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations. By Harold Karan Jacobson and
Eric Stein. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1966. Pp. ix,
538. $8.50.
This book is essentially a detailed and lucid history of the nuclear test ban negotiations which started in 1957 and resulted in the
Moscow Treaty of 1963, banning all except underground nuclear
testing.
The key to the approach which the authors have chosen is found
in their title-"Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians." Certainly, the
nuclear test ban treaty was a major international event. It dispelled
the fears of many that further testing in the atmosphere would result in a dangerous release of radioactive products. In addition, the
treaty could be a step toward further and more extensive agreements to deal with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons,
which many regard as the top priority problem in the maintenance
of world peace. However, an historical narrative which is confined
to chronicling the events leading to these achievements would disregard what may be the most interesting and significant feature of
the negotiations-the revelation of the processes and methods of
diplomatic negotiation employed by both the Soviet Union and the
United States to achieve a precise accord. Therefore, it seems to me
that the title properly places the emphasis.
During the more than ten years of disarmament and arms control negotiations in the United Nations which had preceded the test
ban negotiations, it had been virtually impossible to focus the negotiations on a practical program of arms control in counter-distinction
to broad, sweeping generalities, such as the Soviet "Ban the Bomb"
propaganda slogan of the 1940's, and sweeping declarations of the
desirability of regulation and reduction of all armaments under
adequate safeguards. Only in the early discussions of the Baruch
Plan for international control of atomic energy in 1946 and 1947
had the Soviet Union been willing to consider the vast arrangements
which might be required for any arms control program. But in 1958,
and for five years thereafter, the Soviet Union, having reversed its
long standing practice in connection with this one problem, concentrated on the most precise details-the number of inspection
posts that would be required, their location and composition, the
organization and direction of an international control organ, and
many other similar problems. Additionally, for the first time, scientists played an appreciable role in the development and presentation of the positions of the negotiating powers.
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In describing the significance of the negotiations, the authors
point out that:
[These negotiations] perhaps better than any other international
negotiations which have been conducted since the end of the Second
World War [reveal] how the United States has attempted to resolve
the complicated issues relating to the formulation, implementation,
and substance of security policy stemming from the emergence of
nuclear weapons. They also offer sharp insights into the functioning
of the international political system in the nuclear era and possible
future developments.

The negotiations provide the opportunity to test not only the substance of American security policy, but also "the consensus-building
model" in formulating and implementing that policy.
[The negotiations] illustrate in a graphic manner the interaction
between domestic events, national policies, and international occurrences. They offer a striking picture of diplomatic intercourse between a totalitarian state with tightly sealed policy-making and
close controls over its mass media on the one hand, and two relatively open, pluralistic states on the other.

The book achieves its greatest success in its discussion of the
methods of formulating United States policy and both the achievements and limitations of that policy. The narrative demonstrates
convincingly the impossibility of completely separating scientific
and political considerations. The very nature of the technical problems requires an intermingling of scientific and political factors in
establishing value judgments. The American and Soviet scientists
might agree on the specific data and nevertheless reach diametrically
opposed conclusions from the data on such essential matters as the
significance of seismic signals.
The narrative points out the many limitations, indeed handicaps, inherent in policy formulation in the United States--the occasions when the American negotiators had to take positions in international forums in advance of obtaining the factual data to support
their positions, the political considerations which delayed, sometimes for years, the formulation of positions which take into account
the newest technical developments, the difficulties of obtaining in
the highest levels of our government an understanding of the positions based upon new developments, and the obtaining of the necessary policy clearances. Anyone reading this book will acquire some
idea of one of the prime problems which has always confronted the
negotiators in the field of arms control-the tremendous dilution of
thought which takes place in transforming a technically sound position into the broad general terms required for international negoti-
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ations. The reader will also realize that with the advent of the administration of John F. Kennedy, came a gradual lessening of
obstacles and delays in United States policy-making.
It would have been highly desirable if the authors could have
achieved a detailed analysis of Soviet policy-making along the same
lines. However, access to the individual policy-makers in the Kremlin-the "one-feather indians" as well as the "chiefs"-was out of
the question. The necessarily inadequate substitute is a close analysis of the changing Soviet technical positions and their relationship
to world events, a course which the authors have followed while
recognizing that their conclusions, in many instances, can be little
better than surmises. Perhaps the analysis might have benefited
from greater reference to the substantial amount of literature which
has appeared in the last three or four years in the Soviet Union,
some of which has been translated into English, on Soviet strategic
policy. I believe that this literature furnished one factor which
would help to explain the increasing Soviet intransigence during
the latter years of the negotiations on the question of on-site inspection. Nuclear capabilities can be achieved by the "have not" states
through two methods: testing, or transfers from the "haves." Commencing in 1961, the Soviet Union seemed to place more emphasis
on the latter method than on the former. There is much evidence to
indicate that Khrushchev's final agreement to a limited test ban
stemmed from a belief that the next sJep which would follow quickly
would be the unqualified prohibition of weapon transfers from the
"haves" to the "have nots." In the absence of a satisfactory United
States formula to achieve this result, further progress toward an
unlimited test ban seemingly became a low priority in the Soviet
Union. A more thorough discussion of the changing relationship
between the test ban and other antiproliferation measures would
have been useful, but would have greatly lengthened the book.
In attempting a meaningful description of complex negotiations
extending over many years, the authors are caught benv-een Scylla
and Charybdis. A simple chronicle of events would be meaningless,
since in any negotiations with the Soviet Union and particularly in
arms control negotiations, the meaing of the events cannot be
determined purely and simply from the statements of the parties.
Every historian of the arms control negotiations must constantly
embark on verbal excursions in order to relate the specific events
of the narrative to the background. In the entire literature of arms
control, I have never found any volume which has been more succussful in achieving the proper balance between narration and explanation, in stressing the background of the developments without
losing the continuity. Largely for this reason, I believe that this
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book is and will continue to be the definitive narrative of an important historical episode.
Bernard G. Bechhoefer,
Member of The District of
Columbia Bar.*

• Mr. Bechhoefer served as senior officer of the Department of State on the arma•
ments control negotiations from 1946-58, and is the author of Postwar Negotiations for
Arms Control (Brookings Institute, 1961).

